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ON March 21, 1946, a new set of rules of criminal procedure for the
federal courts went into effect. Hailed by former Attorney General
Homer Cummings as "a triumph of the democratic process," 1 this
body of rules is the non-legislative product of a laborious, eight-year
enterprise which required the participation of a great many individuals
and groups throughout the United States, including judges, lawyers,
government officers, legal scholars, and committees of bench and bar.
In contrast with the unwieldy legislative codes of criminal procedure
of many of the states, these rules occupy but sixty small pages of large
print.2 In a pocket edition, as the late Judge George Z. Medalie once
remarked, they would take up no more space than a box of matches.
HISTORY
The movement to extend this type of rule-making to federal criminal
procedure generally dates back to 1938, originating "as an integral
part of a broad program for simplicity and efficiency in all branches of
judicial administration." 3 The Criminal Appeals Rules had been
promulgated by the Court in 1934,4 to be followed in 1941 by the Petty
Offense Rules.5 In 1938 the Attorney General initiated the present
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Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
1. Cummings, The New Criminal Rules-Another Triumph of the Democratic Process
(1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 236.
2. RULES OF CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE FOR "nE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1946) U. S. Gov. Printing Office.
3. Vanderbilt, Foreword, The New Federal Criminal Rules (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 719-20:
"The federal system of courts did not attain its present symmetry of district courts, circuit
courts of appeals, and a Supreme Court without considerable experimentation. The Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts was born of turmoil. [See (1927) 23 A. B, A. J.
385, 387. The proposal for a "Proctor" was favored by 39,990 lawyers, opposed by 23,841,
whereas the proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court was favored by 18,533, opposed by
51,156.] The act granting the rule-making power in civil cases to the Supreme Court was
passed only after a crusade by the bar lasting thirty years. [See Supreme Court Adopts
Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 97.] In contrast, the
act conferring on the Court the rule-making power in criminal cases up to verdict [54 STAT
688, 18 U. S. C. 687 (1940)] was passed without opposition, largely as a result of the example
of the Civil Rules and of the Act of 1934 conferring on the Court rule-making power in crimi.
nal cases after verdict. [47 STAT. 904 (1933), as amended 48 STAT. 399 (1934), 18 U. S. C.
§ 688 (1940)]. The Supreme Court's broad rule-making powers now cover not only tradi-
tional civil and criminal proceedings but also such fields as bankruptcy and copyright cases."
4. Order of May 7, 1934, 292 U. S. 661. The enabling legislation under which these
rules were promulgated does not require submission to Congress.
5. Order of January 6, 1941, 311 U. S. 733, pursuant to the Act of Oct. 9, 1940, 54
STAT. 1058, 18 U. S. C. §§ 576-576d (1940). This enabling legislation does not require sub.
mission to Congress.
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movement,6 and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion promptly adopted a resolution urging adoption of the necessary
enabling legislation. Arthur T. Vanderbilt was appointed chairman of
a special committee of the Association to prepare such legislation, and
shortly thereafter Senate 1283 and House of Representatives 4587
were introduced. Hearings were held before a sub-committee of the
House Judiciary Committee in May, 1939. Enactment of the necessary
legislation was in turn urged by Justices Murphy and Jackson during
their terms as Attorney General, and endorsed by the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to the American Law Institute on
May 9, 1940. 7 The measure became law on June 29,1940.3
Early in 1941 the Court appointed an Advisory Committee to assist
in the preparation of the contemplated "rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure with respect to proceedings prior to and including ver-
dict, or finding of guilty or not guilty, in criminal cases in district courts
of the United States," I and the Committee held its first meeting at
Washington on February 21, 1941 for preliminary discussion. The
procedure then agreed upon was essentially that which had been so
successfully employed by the earlier Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure. Successive drafts would be prepared by the Reporter
and his staff, assisted by members of the Committee. Each draft
would then be reviewed and revised, section by section, at a meeting
of the full Committee. (Typically, such a meeting consumed four
days). Preliminary drafts so prepared would be published and dis-
6. Cummings, A Rounded System of Judicial Ruk-Mahing (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 513;
SELECTED PAPERs OF HOMEuR Cu.ur'GS (Swishers ed., 1939), 181 d sel.; Cummings, Ex-
tending the Rule-Making Power to Federal Criminal Procedure (1938) 22 J. Ax. JUn. Soc. 151;
REP. ATr'Y GEN. (1938), Item No. IV, at 4.
7. Cummings, The New Criminal Rules-Another Triuraph of the Denocratic Process
(1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 236, 237-S.
8. 54 ST.T. 68S (1940), 18 U. S. C. § 637 (Supp. 1945). This act provides that "Such
rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congrezs by the Attorney
General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the clo-e of such cevsion,
and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force and effect."
9. Order of February 3, 1941, 312 U. S. 717. The original members of the Committee
were Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Newark, New Jersey, Chairman; James J. Robinson, Profezzor
of Law at the Indiana University Law School, Reporter; Judge Alexander Holtzoff, Wash-
ington, D. C., Secretary; the late Newman F. Baker, Professor of Law at the Northwestern
University Law School; Judge George James Burke, Ann Arbor, Michigan; John J. Burns,
Boston, Mass.; Judge Frederick E. Crane, New York City; Gordon Dean, Washington,
D. C.; Sheldon Glueck, Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School; the late Judge George
Z. Medalie, New York City; Lester B. Orfield, Professor of Law at the University of Ne-
braska Law School; Murray Seasongood, Cincinnati, Ohio; J. 0. Seth, Santa Fe, New
Me--co; John B. Waite, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School; Herbert
Wechsler, Professor of Law at the Columbia Law School; G. AaronYoungquist, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and the writer. George F. Langsdorf, of Oakland, California, vas added by
Order of May 26, 1941, 313 U. S. 602; and Judge Hugh D. McLellan, of Boston, Maczachu-
setts, by Order of October 27, 1941, 314 U. S. 719.
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tributed (by permission, but without the sanction of the Court) to all
interested persons and groups, and in particular to local, state and
federal committees of the bench and bar organized for the purpose, to
invite criticism and suggestions.
In May, 1943 the Committee published a Preliminary Draft, with
notes and forms, this being a revision of six successive confidential
drafts prepared in the Committee.10 Rules to govern appeals, as well
as proceedings up to and including verdict, were included, pursuant
to two orders so extending the Committee's assignment." After further
revision a Second Preliminary Draft, of similar scope, was printed and
circulated in February, 1944. In June, 1944 the Committee met to
consider further suggestions and to revise the Second Preliminary
draft, and transmitted its final report to the Court in July, 1944.12
With certain revisions, the rules governing proceedings up to and in-
cluding verdict were adopted by the Court and transmitted to the
Attorney General on December 26, 1944 to be reported to the Con-
gress at the beginning of the regular session on January 3, 1945.13 A
rule regulating criminal appeals by the United States under the Act of
May 9, 1942 was likewise reported to the Congress on the same date,
having been transmitted by the Court to the Attorney General on
December 30, 1944.14 A volume of notes to the rules governing pro-
ceedings up to and including verdict, prepared under the direction of
the Advisory Committee, was published in March, 1945.11 In addition
, 10. The first was dated September 8, 1941; the second, January 12, 1942; the third,
March 4, 1942; the fourth and fifth, May, 1942; and the sixth, fall of 1942.
11. By Order of November 17, 1941, 314 U. S. 719, the Committee was authorized and
directed "to make such recommendations as may be deemed advisable respecting amend-
ments to the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Con-
gress, approved March 8, 1934, amending an Act entitled 'An Act to give the Supreme
Court of the United States authority to prescribe Rules of Practice and Procedure with
respect to proceedings in criminal cases after verdict' (Act of February 24, 1933, c. 119,
28 U. S. C., § 723 (a) )."
By Order of October 26, 1942, 317 U. S. 715, the Committee was authorized and directed
"to make such recommendations as may be deemed advisable respecting promulgation of
rules of practice and procedure," pursuant to the Act of May 9, 1942 (Public Law 543,
77th Congress), authorizing the Court to promulgate rules governing appeals by the United
States in certain cases.
12. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVisoRY COMMITTEE
(1944).
13. RULEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1944). See letter from The Attorney General transmitting RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 12, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
14. LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TRANSMITTING A RULE REGULATING
CRIMINAL APPEALS By THE UNITED STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 3, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
The enabling act is 56 STAT. 271 (1942), 18 U. S. C. A. § 682 (Supp. 1945).
15.. NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR TlE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1945).
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to the rules thus reported to Congress, the Court adopted, with certain
modifications, the rules prepared by the Advisory Committee to govern
proceedings after verdict. The complete set of rules and recommended
forms, including the latter rules, as promulgated by the Court, was
published in 1946.16 This last together with the volume of notes men-
tioned above constitute the end product.
In addition to the above legislative, committee and judicial history
of the rules, there is already a considerable literature. 17 Most of the
articles by Committee members were written while the enterprise was
still in progress, and reflect the policy considerations which moved the
Committee. Those by others constitute but a small fraction of the
response to the Committee's invitation of suggestions and criticism of
the preliminary drafts.
The value of this latter phase of the rule-making procedure as a
means of perfecting the product, and of winning its acceptance, can
hardly be over-stressed in the light of the Advisory Committee's
experience. The procedure depends upon the Advisory Committee
taking the initiative and bearing the brunt of the research, the initial
policy decisions and policy formulation. But the Committee also
served, as former Attorney General Homer Cummings has expressed
it, as "a conduit through which judges, prosecutors, attorneys, gov-
ernment officials and others interested in the functioning of criminal
justice, throughout the length and breadth of the land, could present
their problems and make known their needs." Through the ramif)ing
16. RuLEs oF CERI.IAL PRocEnuRE FoR TuE DisTRIcT Cotmrs op TUU UaIT
STATES (1946). The rules governing proceedings after verdict, which were not required to be
reported to Congress, are numbered 32-39.
17. FEDERAL RULES OF CRm qAL. PROcEDURE wiir NOTES ,.ND I1 STTE Prozrx-
INGS (1946); Barron, Proposed Rules of Procedure in Criminal Cases, 2 F. R. D. 211; Berge,
The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 42 MICH. L. Rv. 353; Berge,
Some Comments on the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 34 J. Cnri. L.
222; Cummings, The New Criminal Rules-Another Triumph of the Dene.ratli Process
(1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 236; Cummings, A Rounded System of Judicial Rlc.ma.ing (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 513; Cummings, The Third Great Adventure (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 654; Dean,
Rule-Making for Criminal Procedure (1940) 24 J. A--. JuD. Soc. 81; Dession, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1944) 13 Co.-N. B. J. 58; Hall, ObMjcctlircs of Federal
Criminal Procedural Revision (1942) 51 Y.LE L. J. 723; Harno, Proposcd Rules of Federal
Criminal Procedure: Final Draft (1944) 42 AMicH. L. REv. 623; Holtzoff, Cedificalion of Fed-
eral Criminal Procedure FED. BAR. J., Oct. 1944, 18-37; Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal
Procedure (1944) 12 GEo. MVisa. L. REv. 119, 3 F. R. D. 445; Holtzoff, The Right of Counse!
Under the Sixth Amendment (1944) 20 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1; Holtzoff, Same Prolemas of
Federal Criminal Procedure (1942) 9 J. B. A. D. C. 554; 10 Id. 69, 2 F. R. D. 431; Hovard,
Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 763; Longsdorf, New Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (1943) 18 CALiF. STvTE B. J. 263; 'Maguire, Proposed New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 23 ORE. L. REv. 56; Aledalie, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1944) 4 LAwFErs GUILD REv. (3) 1; Orfield, Improving Procedure on Judgment
and Appeal in Federal Criminal Cases (1943) 27 Mm. L. REv. 169, 2 F. R. D. 573; Orfield,
Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 22 TE.. L. REv. 194,
19461
THE YALE LAW JQURNAL
network of circuit, state, district and local committees, the grass roots
were tapped. The result was "a code of criminal procedure imposed
neither by legislature nor by court-but originating from every in-
formed source." Only through some such procedure could so compre-
hensive and integrated a reformulation of principles be translated in so
short a time into law in a society such as ours. The validity of the
procedure is demonstrated by the practical experience of the legal
profession with the earlier Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8
PoLIcY
The importance attributed by all involved to fair and effective
federal administration of criminal justice is evident from the fact that
the rule-making project was not suspended during the war. Indeed,
it was felt that the war heightened that importance. War creates new
strains on most institutions, including those concerned with the fair
221; Phillips, Suggestions and Comments on Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(1943) 17 FLA. L. J. 230; Robinson, Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943)
27 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 38; Rossman, A Study of Rules 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Particular Respect to their Suitability for Adoption
into State Criminal Procedure (1945) 25 ORE. L. REv. 21; Seasongood, Proposed Federal
Rules for Criminal Procedure (1942) 13 Mo. B. J. 163; Stewart, Comments on Federal Rulles
of Criminal Procedure (1943) 8 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 296; Tibbs, Criminal Procedure Under
Proposed Federal Rules Compared with Wisconsin Statutes (1944) 28 MARQ. L. Rxv. 75;
Vanderbilt, Foreword, The New Federal Criminal Rules (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 719; Vanderbilt,
New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure (1943) 29 A. B. A. J. 376; Waite, The .Proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 27 J. Ai . JuD. Soc. 101, 103; Winters, A Study
'of Rules 6, 7, 8, ahd 9 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with Particular Respect to
Their Suitability for Adoption into State Criminal Procedure (1945) 25 ORE. L. REv. 10.
18. The New Criminal Rules-Another Triumph of the Democratic Process (1945) 31
A. B. A. J. 236, 237. In this connection it may be noted that the rules were not unanimously
adopted. Mr. Justice Black stated that he did not approve, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
filed a dissenting memorandum. 323 U. S. 821 (1944). Cf. Mr. Cummings' response (id.,
238) to the considerations advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"There is occasionally heard some dissent on the ground that the justices of the
Supreme Court, removed from direct day-by-day contact with trials in the district
courts, are without opportunity to observe what rules of procedure are best calcu-
lated to promote the largest measure of justice. But plainly the Supreme Court's
role in these rule-making projects has been largely that of moderator or arbitrator
rather than arbitrary lawgiver-a function which, in a large sense, it exercises daily
in its regular work. Moreover, appellate judges gain a great deal of objective knowl-
edge concerning procedural needs from their examination of appellate records in
cases actually tried in the lower courts.
"The question has also been raised whether an appellate court should be
charged with the duty of promulgating a procedural code, since such a code can
hardly escape provisions in which serious questions may lurk for future adjudica-
tion. This consideration, however, could in no event be more serious than the prob-
lem of stare decisis which the Supreme Court faces so frequently. As a matter of
fact, the Supreme Court has not been embarrassed in the least degree in passing on
questions arising under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which it had previ-
ously approved. Moreover, the continuing power to amend rules once adopted en-
[Vol. 55 : 694
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and just preservation of order.19 There had, moreover, been a signif-
icant expansion in federal criminal law well antedating the war. The
vast development of federal regulation, particularly since 1933, had
brought more and more classes of the population, and more and more
business operations, within the direct orbit of federal criminal sanctions.
It appeared probable that the war, with its inevitable after-complica-
tions, could not but accelerate this trend.
The rules work no revolutionary reforms. Some restate existing law.
Others involve substantial changes. By and large those changes con-
sist in adoption of modem practices developed in the more progressive
states and in England. A few are new. The prime values sought to be
served throughout were, as declared in Rule 2, "simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay." 21
To bring together in one comprehensive code all of the rules govern-
ing a federal criminal proceeding was considered advantageous to
ables the Court to make such timely modifications as actual experience may sug-
gest."
19. See Vanderbilt, Foreward, The New Federal Criminal Rules (1942) 51 YALE L. J.
719, 722:
"In a world torn by international conflict, with national defense our primary
responsibility at the moment, there may be lawyers as well as laymen who wonder
why time and thought should now be devoted to the formulation of federal rules of
criminal procedure. They should be reminded that these rules will expedite the
prompt and efficient trial not only of ordinary criminals but of the many parsons
suspected of being saboteurs or enemy agents. But, even more important, they
should be reminded that the international conflict is essentially a struggle between
law and order on the one side and brute force on the other. Our type of civilization
depends on 'equal justice under law.' The present international struggle is not
merely political; on the contrary, our primary goal is the preservation of freedom
in our own country and its restoration elsewhere. One has but to look back to the
many criminal prosecutions arising in World Var I to realize that in times of crisis
there is always a tendency to disregard the individual's civil rights and liberties. In
our zeal to achieve ultimate victory, we must not cast aside the very thing we are
fighting for."
20. Robert F. Maguire has expressed the practitioner's reaction in Proposed New Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 23 ORE. L. REv. 56:
"I may say . . . in view of the vastly enlarged powers of the Federal Govern-
ment, which seem to have no termini as far as those powers concern the adoption of
new rules and regulations, as well as statutes which have criminal aspects, it is not
at all unlikely that we are going to have to overcome our reluctance to practice
criminal law, as it will be absolutely necessary for anyone who expects to loot: after
the business of his clients to accept criminal cases, because every individual and
business is now directly affected by rules and regulations having criminal aspects."
21. Some of the sources from which the rules spring are discu-s-ed in Orfield, The Pre-
liminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 22 TEX. L. REv. 37, 41-2.
The present writer would be inclined to place less emphasis on the AiEnictu; LLw INsnTu
CODE oF Ca.nsqAL PRocErDuR, and more on the high degree of consensus which emerged
from the wide range of personal background experience in criminal law administration repre-
sented by the committee as an aggregate, and from collaborating groups as well.
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courts, prosecutors, defendants and defense counsel alike. Prior to,
March 21, 1946 federal criminal procedure could fairly be described as
chaotic. Some matters were governed by piecemeal legislation, enacted
at different times, and without apparent effort to achieve an integrated,
cohesive system. As to other matters, common law prevailed; in the
areas subject to the conformity principle, federal procedure looked to
the common law as modified by the constitutions, statutes, and deci-
sions of the courts of the states. To the occasional practitioner in the
federal courts this was naturally confusing, and even experienced
federal judges and practitioners were recurrently subjected to what
would otherwise have been unnecessary technical research.
Uniformity in practice on a nation-wide basis was also desired.
Lawyers practicing in more than one federal district, like judges as-
signed from one district to another, were obliged to adjust to the vary-
ing procedures in criminal cases in the several districts. The methods
of examining prospective petit jurors and of exercising peremptory
challenges were far from uniform. In most districts the Government
was entitled to open and close in argument to the jury, while in others
the government opened and the defense was entitled to close. The
practice governing the examination of the jury for cause varied in
respect of whether the voir dire should be conducted entirely by the
court, entirely by counsel, or by both court and counsel. Some of the
courts, following the lead of the new civil rules, were dispensing with
the necessity for the constant taking of exceptions, while others con-
tinued to require it. Varying practices obtained as to the content and
grounds for demurrers, motions to quash and pleas in abatement, and
there was disagreement as to whether such pleas and motions might be
joined in one document. With respect to jury instructions, most courts
required that separate requests be submitted prior to argument and
instructed the jury at the conclusion of argument; but even here there
was variation. 22
This is not to say, however, that different local conditions do not
dictate different arrangements and details of practice in a variety of
respects. In a metropolitan district a large number of judges sit the
year round. Commissioners and counsel are readily available. Dis-
tances are short. In a sparsely settled rural district-as in the South-
west, for example-opposite conditions obtain. In any given division
there may be a criminal term for but a week or two, once or twice a
year. Distances create problems with respect to speedy arraignment,
the assignment of counsel, time provisions and so on. Since a uniform
set of federal rules had to prescribe a practice suitable for all districts,
it was necessary that the rules be general and flexible, prescribing only
basic essentials, rather than rigid and detailed.
22. Dean, Rule-Makingfor Criminal Procedure (1940) 24 J. AiM. JUD. Soc. 81, 82-3.
[Vol. 55: 694
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Another characteristic more or less peculiar to federal criminal law
.and administration also favored general rules. In contrast to the
relatively simple character of the vast majority of criminal cases
prosecuted in the state courts, many federal cases-anti-trust, war
fraud, mail fraud, sedition, conspiracy, and the like-are extremely
-complex, requiring months and even years to try. Obviously, unique
problems of procedural adjustment must be resolved in such cases if the
judicial machinery is to fulfill its function. But even in federal prac-
tice, a system of procedure geared primarily to the requirements of
these complex cases would be unsatisfactory for the ordinary run. The
complex cases bulk larger in the work of the appellate courts than in
the day to day flow of business in the district courts. The average case
is not appealed, and does not find its -way into the law reports. Indeed,
the great majority of criminal cases are disposed of on plea of guilty.
It follows, as Judge Holtzoff has remarked, that a "distorted Niew of
criminal procedure in actual operation would be obtained by concen-
trating attention on the decisions of the appellate courts in these few
criminal cases that reach the appellate stage, or even by confining one's
study to the procedure followed in the more important cases or occa-
sional cause celebre." 23
The rule-making process in the field of procedure is, of course, no
newcomer to Anglo-American legal tradition,2 4 and its advantages of
23. Holtzoff, Some Problems of Federal Criminal Procedure (1942) 9 J. B. A. D. C. 554,
-557.
24. See Aledalie, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1944) 4 LAv, ns GuImD Rv.
.(3) 1:
"When, in 1940, Congress conferred upon the Supreme Court the power to
make rules of criminal procedure (18 U. S. C. A. § 687 [Supp. 19451 ), theretofore
exercised solely by Congress, it restored a practice which had been a tradition of the
English and Roman Law.
"Throughout the development of the English law, Parliament at no time under-
took to chain the Courts to a legislative code of procedure. Even where statutes
were enacted for the regulation of civil procedure, as in the Civil Procedure Act of
1833 and the Procedure Act of 1852, the judges were authorized to make such alter-
ations in the rules of pleadings and practice as they might deem expedient. Thus,
English practice achieved the same result accomplished by the Romans, whereby
each praetor upon coming into office announced the rules which would govern liti-
gation. In this flexible way, successive praetors built up the procedure which has
become an integral part of the Anglo-American jurisprudence.
"It was not until the middle of the 19th century that there was a change in this
concept of granting to the judiciary the authority to make rules governing judicial
procedure. The Field Code, enacted in New York in 1848, established a precedent
which, widely followed, had an indelible effect on the procedure of the various
states. In the 1920s and 1930s, this legislative freezing of rules of Court became the
subject of vigorous criticism. The New York Code was called a 'political and eco-
nomic blunder of the first magnitude' and it was observed that it 'set a precedent
which changed the American judicial establishment from a living stream into a
stagnant pool.' This view met with vigorous assent by Profs. Wigmore and Pound.
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flexibility are obvious. Legislative bodies have neither the time nor the
facilities to inquire into detailed problems of judicial procedure or to
formulate complete codes, and typically have failed to do so. The
alternative of leaving the formulation of rules of procedure to ordinary
judicial process presents the disadvantage that that process is neces-
sarily limited to dealing with specific questions in particular cases as
they happen to arise. Hence the numerous conflicts between the
various circuits, and the number of important questions which have
sometimes gone unresolved for years. Quite recently, for example, the
Supreme Court has had before it such unresolved basic questions as
that of the limits on the detention and interrogation of arrested persons
prior to arraignment,2" of the meaning and scope of the right to coun-
sel,2 and of the power of courts to correct various types of errors after
the time within which a motion for new trial may be made has elapsed.2"
SCOPE AND APPLICATION
The rules went into effect on March 21, 1946, in the sense that they
are applicable to proceedings commenced thereafter, and likewise,
"so far as just and. practicable," to proceedings then pending.2" They
govern all types of criminal proceedings in the federal courts, including
the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United
States, and proceedings before United States commissioners, with a
few minor exceptions.2 9 In addition to federal courts in the continental
United States, they include the District Courts in Alaska, Hawaii,
Prof. Wigmore made the somewhat startling observation that legislative rule mak-
ing was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine of the
Federal and State Constitutions."
25. McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
26. Adams v. U. S. ex. rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1943).
27. Wells v. U. S., 318 U. S. 257 (1943).
28. Rule 59.
29. Rule 54(a). The exceptions are found in Rule 54(a) and (b), and include preliminary
proceedings before state magistrates empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the United States; removal proceedings from state courts' trials before United States
commissioners and in the district courts under the Act of October 9, 1940, c. 785, 54 STAT.
1058-1059, 18 U. S. C. § 576-576d (1940) relating to petty offenses on federal reservations,
those being governed by the existing rules promulgated by the Supreme Court on January 6,
1941, 311 U. S. 733 (1941); extradition and rendition of fugitives; forfeitures the collection
of fines and penalties; summary trials for offenses against the navigation laws under R.v.
STAT. §§ 4300-4305 (1875), 33 U. S. C. §§ 391-396 (1940); proceedings involving disputes
between seamen under Rlv. STAT. §§ 4079-4081, as amended, 22 U. S. C. §§ 256-258 (1940);
proceedings for fishery offenses under the Act of June 28, 1937, c. 392, 50 STAT. 325-327
(1937) 16 U. S. C. §§ 772-7721 (1940); and proceedings against a witness in a foreign coun-
try under the Act of July 3, 1926, c. 762, 44 STAT. 835 (1926), 26 U. S. C. §§ 711-718 (1940).
The rules are likewise not applicable to proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act "so far as they are inconsistent with that Act." [Rule 54(b)(5)]. They do not
alter the power of judges of the United States or of United States commissioners to hold to
security of the peace and for good behavior under the Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 270,
[VCol. 55 : 694
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Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; and the rules governing proceed-
ings after verdict include the District Court of the Canal Zone as well. :
There was no effort to formulate and include in the rules a complete
code of evidence, not because this would not have been within the
Court's rule-making power, but because it was felt by the Committee
that the rules of evidence should in most respects be the same for
criminal as for civil proceedings. As in the Civil Rules, however, the
subject was not left untouched. Rule 26 provides:
"In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in
open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congre.s or by
these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of
Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience." 31
The rule thus codifies the principle declared in Funk v. United States 32
and Wolfe v. United States,33 to the effect that in criminal trials in fed-
eral courts both the competency of witnesses and the admissibility of
testimony will be governed, in the absence of Congressional enactment,
-not by local law but by common law principles as interpreted by the
federal courts "in the light of reason and experience." The reference
36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 392 (1940), and under REv. STAT. § 4069 (1875), SO
U. S. C. § 23 (1940). Such proceedings, however, shall conform to these rules "so far as they
are applicable."
30. Rule 54(a)(1). The rules do not apply to proceedings before the Supreme Courts of
Hawaii or Puerto Rico, these being purely local appellate courts having no jurisdiction over
the district courts of the United States in those territories. See NOTES To THE RULES or
CsnNL PROCEDURE FOR TE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITD STATES (1945) 44-S.
31. Compare the phrasing of the last clause of this rule in FEDERAL RULES or Cu ,Mn.A
PROCEDUR, PRELIaIINARY DRATr (1943): . . . by the principles of the common law as
interpreted by the courts of the United States." The above language was criticized in
ADDITIONAL STATEISENT BY MESSRS. DEssioN, GLUEcK, ORFIELD, AND WECIbLER, id. at
255-6, as follows:
"The purpose of the rule is to codify the existing law, as developed by the Su-
preme Court in Funk v. U. S., 290 U. S. 370 and Wolfe v. U. S., 291 U. S. 7. We
believe that its purpose is sound. We fear, however, that the rule as drafted may be
taken to refer to the 'principles of the common law' in some narrower sense than the
decisions upon which it is based. To avoid this danger we think it safer to adhere
more closely to the language of the opinions and to adopt as the guiding criterion-
when no act of Congress or rule otherwise provides---'the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.' This fuller statement will indicate that in pasing upon
evidence questions the courts may look not only to the older decisions but also to
enlightened statutory developments in the states. It will make plain that what is
contemplated is a judicial function which is continuously creative to an exception-
ally high degree."
32. 290U.S.371 (1933).
33. 291 U. S. 7 (1934).
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is not to the common law as of 1789, as of the date of admission of any
given state into the Union, or of any given state at the present time.
The federal courts are free to take cognizance of altered conditions, of
the course of legislative change, and of the weight of current judicial
authority. This approach contemplates the development of a uniform
body of rules of evidence for federal criminal trials, unlike Civil Rule
43(a) which provides for partial conformity in civil proceedings.
Existing federal statutes dealing with the admissibility of evidence
and the competency and privileges of witnesses-collected in the Com-
mittee Note to this rule--are expressly continued. Rules 27 and 2&
deal with more particular evidential problems-"Proof of Official
Record," Hand "Expert Witnesses." 5
The qualifications of jurors are not prescribed by the rules. Here
again, it was felt that the problem was common to civil and criminal
proceedings. The Committee did, however, approve the report and
legislation to prescribe uniform qualifications for jurors recommended
by the Knox Committee of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,"-
and suggested that the proposals of the Knox Committee be embodied
in a rule applicable to both types of proceedings. 31
34. Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is here incorporated by reference.
providing a simple and uniform method of proving public records and entry or lack of entry
therein. The numerous federal statutes providing modes of proof in respect of specific offi-
cial records are not superseded. For an enumeration of these, see NoTES ro TE RULES o1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1945) 25-28,
The effect of Rule 44 is to give an option to proceed according to the rule or to the pertinent
statute.
35. Rule 28 provides as follows:
"EXPERT WITNESSES. The court may order the defendant or the government
or both to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may re-
quest the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert wit-
nesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selection.
An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A
witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court at a conference in
which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed
shall advise the parties of his findings, if any, and may thereafter be called to testify
by the court or by any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party. The court may determine the reasonable compensation of such a witness
and direct its payment out of such funds as may be provided by law. The parties
also may call expert witnesses of their own selection."
A court, of course, has the power to call witnesses of its own motion. See NOTES TO TISE
RULES OF CRIMzINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS o TnE UNITED STATES (1945)
28. The purpose of the rule is to provide a procedure whereby the court may, if it chooses,
exercise this power in respect of expert witnesses. Cf. THE UNIFORM EXPERT TESTIMONY
ACT, HANDBOOK OF TEE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS (1937) 337; WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1942) § 563; A. L. I. CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1931) §§ 307-309.
36. REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TEE COMMITTEE ON SELECTION o
JURORS (September, 1942).
37. See Letter of The Chairman, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT (1943) xvi.
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PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
The Complaint. Rule 3 provides that the complaint shall be "a writ-
ten statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged"
and "made upon oath before a commissioner or other officer empowered
to commit persons charged with offenses against the United States."
This involves no major departure from the previous practice, 3 but the
former requirement of conformity to state law is eliminated." The
rule does not specify whether the complaint may be based on informa-
tion and belief rather than personal knowledge, leaving this question
to be determined by each district court.- Nor does the rule expressly
provide that federal complaints may not still be filed with various
state and local magistrates-a practice not very frequently invoked,
but authorized by Section 591 of Title 18, U.S.C. These local magis-
trates are thus still "empowered" to receive complaints within the
meaning of the rule, and proceedings had before them would pre-
sumably continue to be governed by local practice, the new federal
rules being inapplicable to those tribunals.
Warrant or Surnnwns upon Cornplaint. One new feature of Rule 4
is the provision that "Upon the request of the attorney for the govern-
ment a summons instead of a warrant shall issue." The summons has
been the established method for bringing a defendant corporation
before the court,4 ' and the rule now sanctions the same procedure for
natural defendants, when appropriate. Employment of this method,
familiar in many of the states, and in England,"-2 will often save time
and expense, and avoid unnecessary humiliation of defendants. Use of
a letter or telephone call in lieu of a warrant to bring in responsible
defendants has, of course, always been possible. The rule simply
regularizes and encourages such exercise of discretion by prosecuting
38. See United States v. Simon, 248 Fed. 9S0 (E. D. Pa. 1916); United States v.
Maresca, 266 Fed. 713, 719-21 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
39. The Act of May 2S, 1896, c. 252, § 19, as amended, 29 STAT. 184, 31 STAT. 956
(1901), 18 U. S. C. § 591 (1940), provided that persons might be arrested and imprisoned
"agreeably to the usual mode of process" of the state in which proceedings were held. Some
states require that the complaint be in writing, while others do not. Some require pm-onal
knowledge, while others accept a complaint on information and belief.
40. Rule 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court
may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable
statute." See NoTEs To THE RuLEs OF CRnIN.L PaOcEDuRE FOR TEM DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE UNTED STATES (1945) 55: "One of the purposes of this rule is to abrogate any exist-
ing requirement of conformity to State procedure on any point whatsoaver. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been held to repeal the Conformity Act. Sibbach v. Wilson,
312 U. S. 1, 10."
41. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 377 (1940) (Power to issue writs); United States
v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 304 (N. D. Cal. 1898); see also Albrecht v. United States, 273
U. S. 1, 8 (1927).
42. See NoTEs To = RuLEs OF CIn=,AL PROCEDURE ron TmE DisTIcr CoUnTs oF
SUNITED STATES (1945).
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attorneys. The mode of service prescribed is substantially the same
as in civil actions under Civil Rule 4(d)(1). No contempt procedure
for the enforcement of a summons is prescribed, since failure to respond
can be met by the issuance of a warrant.
With regard to warrants of arrest, there are several new features.
Rule 4(a) provides, inter alia, that "More than one warrant or sum-
mons may issue on the same complaint." This has been the practice in
some districts, but in others the practice has been to issue but one
warrant even for defendants jointly indicted.4" The present provision,
together with that in subdivision (e) (3) that "The officer need not have
the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request
he shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible," will
facilitate execution and return in such cases, especially when the de-
fendants must be arrested at different times and places.
Another innovation is the provision in subdivision (c) (2) of the rule
that "The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served
at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States." This is
designed to eliminate certain steps which formerly were necessary
when a defendant was arrested in a district other than that in which
the prosecution was instituted: (1) return of the original warrant non
est inventus, and (2) obtaining a new warrant in the district in which
the defendant is found. 4" Now the original warrant constitutes suffi-
cient authority to arrest the defendant in any district, but does not
affect his rights as to removal. 45
The rule also contains a convenient new provision concerning the
return of a warrant or summons. Subdivision (c) (4) provides:
". .. At the request of the attorney for the government any un-
executed warrant shall be returned to the commissioner by whom
it was issued and shall be cancelled by him. . . . At the request of
the attorney for the government made at any time while the com-
plaint is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled
or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be
delivered by the commissioner to the marshall or other authorized
person for execution or service."
The purpose is to obviate the former necessity of issuing new warrants
in cases where the defendant could not be apprehended for some time,41
Proceedings before the Commissioner. The controversial problem as
43. NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1945) 2.
44. Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917); Palmer v. Thompson, 20
App. D. C. 273 (1902).
45. See Rule 40.
46. Cf. REv. STAT. § 1028 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 603 (1940) (Writs; copy as jailer's au-
thority), and REv. STAT. § 1014 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 591 (1940), dealing with the return of
"copies of process."
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to how long an arrested person may be detained prior to arraignment
for questioning and investigation is left about where it was by the
provision in Rule 5(a) that the arresting officer "shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available com-
missioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States."
Previously the time standard was embodied in the several statutes
governing the various categories of federal officers authorized to make
arrests. Variously phrased--one governing arrests by the F.B.I. re-
quired arraignment "immediately," and one governing the alcohol
tax unit read "forthwith"-all were construed to impose similar duties
of prompt arraignment. 47 The rule restates that duty without sub-
stantial change and, like the statutes, does not specify the consequences
of non-compliance. 4 The history-maling policy laid down by the
Supreme Court in McNabb v. Ukited States " and subsequent cases, to
the effect that admissions or confessions obtained from a suspect while
he is being held prior to and without prompt arraignment shall not be
admissible in evidence, therefore remains in full force.
This new policy is reasonably clear. The idea that arrest should be
permitted only on "probable cause," and the corollary that one ar-
rested should promptly be arraigned before a judicial officer to assure
an objective determination of that issue, developed out of the experi-
ence of the English common law. The idea is incorporated in the Bill of
Rights, and in the several federal statutes prescribing the duties of
arresting officers.
The difficulty, in the view of many enforcement officials, is that there
are serious crimes, especially when committed by organized groups,
47. The most important statutes are 28 STAT. 416 (1894), as amended, 18 U. S. C.
§ 595 (1940); 20 STAT . 341 (1879), 18 U. S. C. § 593 (1940); 48 STAT. 1008 (1934), as amended,
5 U. S. C. § 300 (a) (1940). Others are collected in NOTES -To T E RULEs O' CRnxm;u, PRO-
CEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT CoURTS oF TE UNITED STATES (1945) 4. For discu-s-ions of the
meaning of prompt arraignment under these and similar statutes see Carroll v. Parry, 48
App. D. C. 453 (1919); Janus v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); and
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act (1942) 28 VA. L. RPv. 315, 339-341. Cf. A. L. I. CODE OF
CR.IINAL PROCEDURE (1931), Commentaries to §§ 35, 36.
48. The first Preliminary Draft contained a provision ES (b)] that no statement made by
a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the government should be
admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurred while the defendant was held
in custody in violation of subdivision (a). Interestingly enough, though evolved prior to the
decision of the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, (1943) this pro-
vision stated much the same principle. Nevertheless, it evoked a storm of protest in
prosecution, bar association, and even judicial circles, and was eliminated in the subzequent
drafts. Representative samples of these protests are quoted in Waite, E idence-Poice
Regulation by Rules of Evidence (1944) 42 MAicH. L. REv. 679.
49. 318 U. S. 332 (1943); Anderson v. United States, 318 U. S. 350 (1943); United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
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-which cannot be solved unless suspects may be held incommunicado
-and questioned until they disclose what they know. Public opinion
wants the spectacular cases solved, and apart from those there are, of
course, many cases in which the same procedure will yield results
more readily than legally sanctioned but more laborious techniques of
investigation. Bruce Smith expressed the police point of view in 1929:
".. . it must be remembered that police are creatures of legisla-
tive enactments, and that their control has sometimes been dictated
by some of the wildest vagaries of the legislative imagination. This
definition and restriction of powers has at times been carried so far,
and the police have found themselves confined within such narrow
limits in both administration and criminal investigation, that they
have made furtive, and occasionally open efforts to circumvent
the laws under which they operate." 1o
Faced with these considerations the state courts-and, prior to the
McNabb decision, the federal courts as well-have been accustomed to
-compromise. They have not said that arrest on suspicion or incom-
municado detention can be lawful, and a person so held is entitled to
release on habeas corpus-assuming that he has someone to procure
the writ for him in time. Police indulging in these practices are subject
to discipline and even criminal penalties, and in exceptional cases of
public scandal these sanctions have sometimes been applied. Offending
police officers may also be sued, and in cases where a person mistreated
has turned out to be entirely innocent or possessed of unanticipated
influence, substantial damage verdicts have sometimes resulted. But
the courts have consistently sanctioned the admission in evidence of
confessions obtained from suspects who were being unlawfully held
so long as the confessions were not shown to be otherwise "involuntary"
or suspect.5
The compromise has not been limited to cases of exceptional gravity
and time urgency. The police understandably prefer the leeway which
it affords. The difficulty is that police standards vary, as does the
calibre of personnel. Some seem to experience considerable difficulty
in distinguishing underprivileged from underworld characters, and the
abuses associated with unlawful detention are not confined to the
psychic coercion inherent in protracted questioning by relays of officers.
These things happen because the safeguards upon which the ambiva-
lent traditional confessions rule depends are illusory. A suspect being
questioned before 'arraignment is usually alone with the officers, and
what happened becomes an issue of his word against theirs. Such an
issue is difficult enough for a trial court, and the appellate courts are
even further from the facts.
50. Smith, Municipal Police Administration (1929) 146 ANNALS 1.
51. See Comment (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 758, 760-1; Note (1935) 94 A. L. R. 1036.
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By 1943 there were hints that the Supreme Court had grown dis-
satisfied with prevailing arrangements for protecting the rights of
accused persons in criminal proceedings. In recent cases involving
confessions by suspects who were mentally inferior to their interroga-
tors the Court had displayed a new sensitivity to the potentialities of
psychic coercion. 52 In others coming up by way of habeas corpus from
the penitentiaries in forma pauperis and on painfully handwritten,
home-made briefs, the Court had begun to scrutinize with a sceptical
eye alleged waivers by the accused of his right to representation by
counsel 5 3
The cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the traditional
compromise on police detention and questioning and advanced its new
formula need not now be dwelt on. One-Azderson v. United States 11
-was a prosecution of twenty-one members of the International Union
of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers for conspiracy to damage property
of the TVA (during an obdurate labor dispute at one of the Tennessee
Copper Company's mines in an atmosphere of charges and counter
charges of violence some power lines had been dynamited), and the
other-the 31McNabb 5 -was a prosecution of five Tennessee moun-
taineers for the killing of a federal officer during an encounter between
moonshiners and revenue agents.
In both the government relied on confessions. Those in the Andersen
case were obtained from six of the suspects while they were being held
with fourteen others in a company building which was also used to
house the local sheriff's special deputies, and were the product of inter-
mittent questioning by F.B.I. agents over a period of about six days
during which time the prisoners were not arraigned before any judicial
officer. In the McNabb case four of the accused were arrested in the
early hours of the morning after the shooting, and the fifth mas volun-
tarily taken into custody on the following morning. They were ques-
tioned intermittently by agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit up to about
2 a.m. of the third morning after the shooting, being in custody all this
time. (Each had actually been arraigned promptly before a Commis-
sioner on a bootlegging charge, but this independent proceeding did not
appear in the record transmitted to the Supreme Court).
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions in these cases on
March 1, 1943. In each Justice Frankfurter spoke for the majority.
What made the reversals news to the police and the legal profession
was the fact that the Court did not treat these as "third degree cases"
and dispose of them on the basis of the seeming voluntariness or in-
52. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
53. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458
(1938).
54. 318 U. S. 350 (1943).
55. 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
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voluntariness of the confessions. The Court neither assumed nor found
that any of the defendants had been physically mistreated, beyond the
fact that they had apparently been detained incommunicado for ques-
tioning in "plain disregard" of the legislative policy of prompt arraign-
ment. The objective of that policy, as the Court saw it, was not merely
to protect the innocent, but to secure "conviction of the guilty by
methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident
society," and to outlaNV "easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality
is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection." The
Court had apparently come to the conclusion that the only way to
eliminate third degree abuses which-when they do occur-are in-
variably associated with incommunicado detention, was to insist that
there be no incommunicado detention even for a day or two, and even
though those detained may be well treated, in any case. To discourage
non-compliance the Court proposed to exclude all evidence procured
in violation of the prompt arraignment policy. The new strategy was
to eliminate both the opportunity and the temptation to abuse.
Justice Reed, dissenting, considered the defendants in both cases
guilty, and their confessions entirely voluntary. Nor did he approve
the new strategy, being "opposed to broadening the possibilities of
defendants escaping punishment by these more rigorous requirements
in the administration of justice." Many of the lower federal courts
agreed with him, and with unconcealed hostility to the new approach
began excluding statements and reversing convictions in pending cases
on the slightest of pretexts. Some were so transparent, indeed, that
Attorney General Biddle expressed himself as "unable to understand
why the trial courts should exhibit the passion for excluding statements
which some of these decisions reveal." 56
Opposition to the McNabb rule came to a head in a bill ' introduced
by Representative Hobbs of Alabama. It was short and to the point:
"Be it enacted ...That no failure tQ observe the requirement
of law as to the time withinf which a person under arrest must be
brought before a magistrate, commissioner, or court shall render
inadmissible any evidence that is otherwise admissible."
Hearings were held before the House Judiciary Committee during the
fall and winter of 1943. "Let us now," urged the Congressman, "wipe
out the McNabb rule that is playing havoc with law enforcement,
56. Heariugs before Subcommittee No 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 3690.
78th Cong. 1st Sess. (1943) 33. See the discussion of some of these cases in Comment (1944)
53 YALE L. J. 785, 763-4.
57. H. R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) introduced on November 18, 1943, and re-
introduced at the 2nd Session. The House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill
favorably, with certain amendments, and in the next Congress it passed the House.
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punishing the innocent public while guilty criminals go free." The
effect, he said, would be "like putting on an old shoe." 11 Police spokes-
men supported the bill. Superintendent Kelly of the District of Colum-
bia police told the Committee that a prisoner "when he arrives at the
jail or place that he is committed [after arraignment], receives all kinds
of advice and information from other persons held in jail-namely,
those that are referred to as tier lawyers-and then it is absolutely
impossible to proceed further in a proper manner with the investiga-
tion." 9
"I get the impression," said Congressman Cravens of Arkansas,
"that the purpose of not taking him before the magistrate is to keep
him from getting advice." "No, sir," replied Kelly, "I believe that
every person should be guaranteed the right provided under the Con-
stitution of the United States, but at the same time I believe . . . that
when a person is charged with the commission of a serious crime, there
should not be any interference with the police or detectives until such
case is brought to a definite conclusion. I do not mean that a person
should be held forever, but should be allowed to stay in the custody of
the police for a reasonable time until the investigation is concluded." C1
The bill was opposed by labor spokesmen, and Lee Pressman of the
C.I.O. reminded the Committee that in England the judges of the
King's Bench had prescribed rules for the interrogation of prisoners
while in the custody of the police. Why, he asked, did the Judiciary
Committee not likewise face the problem and request the Department
of Justice to submit proposed rules, with a view to a solution protecting
individual rights while taking care of the exceptional cases of which
the police spoke? 61
Attorney General Biddle pointed out to the Committee that the
Hobbs bill would leave the statutory right to immediate arraignment
(along with an opportunity to the defendant to obtain counsel and
release on bail) where it was, "and the Congress would presumably
intend the rules to be respected even though the evidential sanction
were removed." The arraignment statutes, he felt, should be modified
to allow for exceptional cases, and he recalled the Nazi saboteurs who
landed on Long Island:
"... Mr. Hoover called me, I think it was Thursday night
when the first saboteur was arrested. The last one was not arrested
until 8 or 9 days later. If we had arraigned the first one imme-
diately, that would have forewarned the other seven who were in
58. Hearings, note 56 supra at 128.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. at 97. The English rules and experience are discussed in Comment (1944)
53 YALE L. J. 758, 767-769.
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possession of these dangerous implements. Therefore, I specif-
ically had to disregard the law requiring me to arraign all of them
immediately, for the preservation of the country. I thought it my
duty to do that. In the kidnapping cases, if the first one of a gang
caught is immediately arraigned, the others are immediately put on
notice as to what has happened. It is a serious proposition. A
reasonable time standard would seem to me to justify delay for
such purposes and to achieve such ends." 12
As passed by the House the bill 11 was modified to require arraign-
ment "within a reasonable time," and provided that while failure so
to do should "not render inadmissible any evidence that is otherwise
admissible" such failure should be "prima facie evidence that any ad-
mission or confession made . . . during the time of such unreasonable
detention was made under duress."
What would be the criteria of reasonableness, and of duress? 64 From
the bill alone one might gather that the House wanted to refer the
whole problem back to the Court, unhampered by the rigid provisions
of the arraignment statutes. The Committee Report (Judiciary No.
245), however, explained the bill as a temporary measure which would
"merely nullify the new rule of the McNabb decision," and "declare
that no such policy . . . underlies the laws Congress passed requiring
prompt arraignment." It would give the Committee "time, without
the pressure and penalty of suspended law enforcement, within which
to study these delicate and difficult problems . .."
The suggestion that federal law enforcement was suspended by the
McNabb decision is interesting, in view of the unconvincing factual
evidence produced before the Judiciary Committee." The pity is that
more would be known about this had it not been for the stony resistance
of enforcement officials to the sheer raising of this issue which for cen-
62. Hearings, note 56, at 35-6.
63. H. R. 43, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1944).
64. In the course of the hearings the National Sheriffs' Association endorsed the prin-
ciples of the proposed Uniform Arrest Act-which would countenance detention for investi-
gation (not to be considered an arrest) by the police for not more than two hours when rea-
sonable ground for suspicion exists, and which would require arraignment after arrest with-
out unreasonable delay and in any event within 24 hours (Sundays and holidays excluded)
unless a judge for good cause shown orders a further postponement for an additional period
of not more than 48 hours. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act (1942) 28 VA. L. REV. 315,
343-347. Such a procedure would facilitate the production of prisoners at the police line-up,
It would give the police all the time they need for questioning in the ordinary run of not too
difficult cases. It would not, however, have solved the Attorney General's problem in the
Saboteurs' case, nor would it have sufficed for the kidnapping cases cited by Mr. Hoover, or,
fo r- that matter, in the Anderson case.
65. Hearings, note 56, at 31 et seg. The Attorney General cited about a dozen reversals,
including the Gros espionage case, the Haupt treason case, the Runnels murder case (in
which there was incommunicado detention for 17 days by State deputy sheriffs), the Wilborn
case of attempted rape and the Johnston case of stabbing assault. In addition to these the
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turies has pressed for solution. The McNabb rule has now been in force
for over three years-long enough, had the Department of Justice and
the federal police agencies accepted the venture and bent their energies
to giving the new approach a fair trial, to have developed a significant
record of experience. Objections at the outset that the new rule would
not work were useful only as hypotheses to be tested; for once the
decision had been handed down it was obvious that the new rule would
prevail for some period of time.
Read against this background, a suggestion in the Committee Note
to Rule 5(a) maybe misleading. The Note states:
". .. What constitutes 'unnecessary delay,' i.e., reasonable
time within which the prisoner should be brought before a com-
mitting magistrate, must be determined in the light of all the facts
and circumstances of the case. . . ." 
But, obviously, the question is whether the duty of arraignment "vith-
out unnecessary delay" permits an arresting officer only such time as
may be needed to bring the offender before the nearest available
magistrate, or whether, in addition, it permits a certain amount of time
for interrogation and investigation. The decisions of the Court, begin-
ning with the MlfcNabb case, clearly suggest the former interpretation.
The language of Rule 5(a) works in no different direction. The McNabb
rule, as is generally recognized, departs from the prevailink state
practice in this regard, and yet the Committee Note,--which is, of
course, unofficial--goes on to state that Rule 5(a) "also states the
prevailing state practice," citing the Commentaries to Sections 35
and 36 of the A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure.
District of Columbia police, more than S months after the McNabb decision, reported come
24 cases in the District as having been affected by the new rule. Several were cases of petit
larceny (one involved the theft of some old rags, another of a sxaophone). In 4 more (2 of
murder and 2 of theft) the only complaint was that statements obtained from the accused
could not be used in evidence, there being no suggestion that other evidence was not avail-
able. In 12 more, including 7 burglaries and 2 robberies, the only complaint was that the
McNabb rule had precluded presentation of the accused at the nightly "police line-up"
which might have developed evidence of other offenses, but all were convicted of their Inown
crimes. Eight cases of individuals believed by the police to be guilty but whose coaictions
were reversed by reason of the McNabb rule made up the balance, 4 for murder, and 2 for
robbery being the most serious.
Presumably the list could be supplemented by similar cases occurring after November,
1943, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere in the United States. As it is, this handful
of cases constitutes the record to support the opinion that the McArabb rule is playing havoc
with federal law enforcement. There is no way of judging from the outside whether the
police work in any of them was up to standard; and during the eight months period which
they represent, a total of some 36,000 federal criminal cases were disposed of, according to
Representative Hobbs' estimate at the hearings.
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Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule 5 govern the proceedings before the
commissioner. As under the previous practice, 67 the defendant is to be
informed of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel
and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He is also to be
advised that he is not required to make a statement, and that any
statement made by him may be used in evidence. Examination may be
waived by the accused, and in any event subdivision (c) provides that
he "shall not be called upon to plead." This latter provision is based
on considerations of fairness, having in mind that most defendants are
not represented by counsel at this stage."8
The rule does not provide for interrogation of an accused by the
commissioner. Such provision has been proposed by Professor John B.
Waite and others, who argue that "prompt interrogation, even after
explicit warning that answer is unnecessary and, may be dangerous,
does seem in actuality to produce information which is more difficult to
obtain later and which, when so obtained by a commissioner, is less
subject to suspicion than when obtained by the police." 69 In rejecting
the proposal the Committee was influenced in part by the prevalent
feeling that such a procedure would probably be in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and in part by the consideration
that most commissioners are part time officers, frequently not lawyers
and unskilled in the art of examination. Unlike the European juge
d'instruction, our commissioners have neither the facilities nor the time
to examine investigative reports.and interview witnesses as a basis for
effective interrogation of an accused.70
67. See MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS, published by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.
68. A plea of guilty before the commissioner entered by a defendant unrepresented by
counsel has been held inadmissible in evidence. Wood v. United States, 128 F. (2d) 265
(App. D. C. 1942). The technical nature and status of the proceedings before the commis-
sioner are discussed in Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278 (1895).
69. See the Supplement to FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT (1943) 249-50.
70. Id., at 253-4.
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